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COMMENT
The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New
Obligations for Authors' Moral Rights?
On October 31, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed the Berne Conven-
tion Implementation Act (BCIA),I the enabling legislation for United States ad-
herence to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works (Berne). 2 The Berne Convention has been in existence for more than 100
years, but it was not until recently that the United States seriously considered
becoming a member, though many scholars and copyright attorneys have advo-
cated membership. 3 Some commentators have hesitated to advocate member-
ship because several aspects of American copyright law were incompatible with
Berne.4 One area of incompatibility that Congress saw as an obstacle to United
States adherence to Berne is "Article 6bis" of the Convention,5 which guaran-
1. Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (codi-
fied at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 104, 116, 116A, 205, 301, 401-08, 411, 501, 504, 801 (West Supp. 1989)).
2. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works originally was
signed September 9, 1886, and was revised in 1908, 1928, 1948, 1967, and 1971. International Union
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 (revised 1908,
1928, 1948, 1967, 1971) [hereinafter Berne]. The most recent revision of Berne occurred in Paris in
1971. Berne, July 24, 1971, reprinted in 4 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
app. 27 (1989). This version of the convention was never entered into, a fact that has no effect on its
validity or force. Note, Internationalizing the Copyright Code: An Analysis of Legislative Proposals
Seeking Adherence to the Berne Convention, 76 GEo. L.J. 467, 467 n.3 (1987).
The convention went into force in the United States on March 1, 1989. The implementing
legislation also went into effect on March 1, 1989. Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-568, § 13(a), 102 Stat. 2853, 2861 (1988) (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1989)).
Berne is a non-self-executing treaty and needs implementing legislation to make it effective. FINAL
REPORT OF THE AD Hoc WORKING GROUP ON U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION
[hereinafter AD Hoc REPORT], reprinted in U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. 504-05 (1985-86) [hereinafter ADHERENCE HEARINGS] (the Ad Hoc
Working Group was comprised of staff members of the United States Copyright Office, copyright
attorneys, and scholars with the purpose of advising Congress as to the changes in domestic law
necessary for Berne adherence).
The Berne Convention is the oldest and most comprehensive international copyright treaty in
the world. The 77 members of the Berne Union include developing countries, communist countries,
and free market nations. S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 3706, 3707 [hereinafter S. REP.]. Berne protects literary and artistic prop-
erty and is dedicated to the concept of universal copyright protection. Berne's universal protection
guarantees "national treatment," which assures the citizens of its member states the same degree of
protection abroad that each state affords its own citizens. H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (1988) [hereinafter H.R. REP.].
3. See DuBoff, Winter, Flacks & Keplinger, Out of UNESCO and into Berne: Has United
States Participation in the Berne Convention for International Copyright Protection Become Essential?,
4 CARDOZO ART & ENT. L.J. 203, 204, 208 (1985); Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revi-
sions of the Berne Convention and the United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499, 499-502
(1967); Sandison, The Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention: The American
Experience, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 89, 89-95 (1986).
4. See AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 2, in ADHERENCE HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 430-32; see
also Nimmer, supra note 3, at 500-47 (focusing on the 1967 revision to the Copyright Act and the
possibilities for making American law compatible with Berne).
5. Berne, supra note 2, art. 6bis.
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tees the author of a work certain "moral rights" separate from ownership of the
work and the economic rights of the copyright.6 The United States joined Berne
without making any change in domestic law regarding moral rights, based on
Congress' conclusion that American law already provided moral rights to both
domestic and foreign authors.7 In reaching this conclusion, however, Congress
failed to recognize the distinction between economic and moral rights; as a re-
sult, the United States claims full adherence to Berne but lacks the legal struc-
ture to support the full array of rights provided by the Convention.
After presenting a brief history of Berne, this Comment will explain why
the United States joined Berne and what it hopes to derive from membership.8
Berne membership brings with it certain obligations, in particular the promise
that each member nation will protect authors' rights to paternity and integrity in
their works.9 This Comment will expose the deficiencies of United States moral
rights protection by showing that American law focuses on economic injury to
authors while largely ignoring offenses to the author's honor and reputation. t0
This Comment will demonstrate further the inability of American law to meet
Berne's standards and will propose legislation that will guarantee authors' moral
rights and protect the integrity of their works.II
Berne originally was signed in 1886 after two conferences that created an
international copyright treaty.12 The idea of forming an international copyright
treaty found simultaneous support from the governments and the artists of sev-
6. Article 6bis was added to Berne during the Rome Convention of 1928. DuBoff, Winter,
Flacks & Keplinger, supra note 3, at 205 & n.15. It provides:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to,
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
Berne, supra note 2, art. 6bis.
The concept of moral rights is foreign to American copyright law. "Under the U.S. Constitu.
tion, the primary objective of copyright law is not to reward the author, but rather to secure for the
public the benefits derived from the author's labors." Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1987:
Hearings on H.R. 1623 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administrative Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1343 (1987), 2d Sess. 1343 (1988) [herein-
after BCIA Hearings). Moral rights protect the honor and reputation of the individual creator,
sometimes at the expense of the copyright owner and the public. See Comment, An Artist's Personal
Rights in His Creative Works: Beyond the Human Cannonball and the Flying Circus, 9 PAC. L.J.
855, 860 (1978). Based on the fundamental rights of paternity (the right to claim or disclaim author-
ship of a work) and integrity (the right to object to mutilation or distortion of a work) an artist
conceivably could prevent the owner of a work from hanging it upside down.
Moral rights are not defined so clearly as the economic and property rights most American
copyright owners enjoy. Under American copyright law, the copyright owner possesses certain ex-
clusive rights to reproduce a work and create derivative works for profit. 17 U.S.C. § 106(l)-(2)
(1982). As a property owner, the owner of a work can change its color or even destroy the work.
The moral right to object to certain use of a work, however, could trump both economic and prop-
erty rights in the work. As the creator, the author would retain some stake in its presentation, since
the author's honor and reputation would be judged by the work.
7. See 134 CONG. REC. S14,553 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); S.
REP., supra note 2, at 3714.
8. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
9. Berne, supra note 2, art. 6bis.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 68-158.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 174-81.
12. Bogsch, The First Hundred Years of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
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eral European and Latin American countries. 13 These nations wanted to pre-
vent the increasing international piracy of their authors' works. 14 Prior to Berne,
each country protected its own authors through domestic copyright law, 15 but
each country also considered it perfectly acceptable for its citizens to use works
created in other countries as they wished. 16
In the early 1880s, several countries recognized that the disadvantages of
forgoing protection for the works of domestic authors far outweighed the advan-
tages of pirating foreign authors' works.1 7 This shift in attitude resulted from
the increased activities of domestic authors and their demands for reciprocal
protection abroad, the governments' desire for international respectability, and
pressures from merchants who sought the trade benefits from the production of
internationally marketable goods.18 Thus, from government and the literary
and artistic communities, Berne was born. Twelve nations signed the first con-
vention, 19 which assured a minimum standard of protection for the authors of
signatory nations.20 The cardinal principles of Berne, from the first convention
through all of its revisions, 2 1 have remained unchanged.
Berne is a union for the protection of copyright, and the member nations
are to act as a cooperative unit. Berne nations adhere to the rule of national
treatment, which provides that "authors should enjoy in other countries the
same protection for their works as those countries accord to their own au-
thors."'22 Berne is administered by the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO) and has been ratified by seventy-seven countries. 23
After World War II, when the United States sought membership to an in-
Artistic Works, 1986 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORGANIZATION 291,
295-96.
13. Ricketson, The Birth ofthe Berne Union, 11 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 9, 23 (1986). Countries
that experimented with moral rights protection before Berne include France, Germany, Belgium, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Guatemala, and Mexico. Id. at 10-i1.
14. Id. at 12-13.
15. By 1886 almost all European countries, seven Latin American countries, and the United
States had domestic copyright laws. Id. at 11.
16. Id. at 12.
17. Id. at 13.
18. Id. Much of the pressure for governments to join an international copyright convention
came from the artistic and literary communities in Europe. In 1878 Victor Hugo, the noted French
writer, organized a major international literary conference under the auspices of the French Socidtd
des Gens de Lettres to discuss the issue of international protection for the works of authors and
artists. W. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 235 (1906). The conference "'ex-
ist[ed] for the defen[se] and propagation of the principles of international literary and artistic prop-
erty .... It protect[ed] the interests of authors and artists in every country, and establish[ed]
between them ties of confraternity.'" Id. at 236 (quoting ASSOCIATION LITTERAIRE ET ARTIS-
TIQUE: SON HISTOIRE-SEs TRAVAUX, 1878-1889 vii).
19. The 12 original nations were Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Costa Rica, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Haiti, Holland, Norway and Sweden, Paraguay, Salvador, and Switzerland. W.
BRIGGS, supra note 18, at 237.
20. Id. at 239.
21. See supra note 2.
22. H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 2, at 12.
23. DuBoff, Winter, Flacks & Keplinger, supra note 3, at 204. Since the beginning of Berne,
five nations have renounced membership: Montenegro (1900), Liberia (1930), Haiti (1943), Indone-
sia (1960), and Syria (1962). Estonia and Latvia left the Convention after World War II, following
annexation by the Soviet Union. Bogsch, supra note 12, at 300.
1990"]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ternational copyright treaty free from many of the obligations of Berne, it helped
form the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC).24 Over time the United
States found the protections of the UCC inadequate to meet all of its interna-
tional copyright needs.25 In addition, the United States wanted to expand its
influence in international copyright matters. One major disadvantage of the
UCC is that it is administered by the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), from which the United States withdrew in
1984, thereby relinquishing voting status on all UCC issues.26 The United
States' Membership in Berne would increase the number of countries with which
the United States enjoys copyright reciprocity. 27 Further, it is the United States'
goal to include an intellectual property provision within the General Agree-
ments on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 28 and the Berne model would be the most
widely accepted backdrop for such a plan.2
9
When the United States considered joining the Berne Convention, several
areas of United States copyright law were recognized as incompatible with the
treaty language.30 In order to make adherence to the treaty possible, Congress
amended certain domestic copyright law provisions to achieve compliance with
Berne. 31 Other provisions of domestic law were left untouched, however.32 The
24. The Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2732, T.I.A.S. No. 3324, 753
U.N.T.S. 368, revised, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868, 943 U.N.T.S. 178. The
UCC gives the copyright owner the protection only of the country in which the copyright was ob-
tained; therefore, an author must comply with the formalities of each country in which protection is
sought. Id. art. 11(1), 25 U.S.T. at 1345, T.I.A.S. No. 7868, 943 U.N.T.S. at 195.
25. Since World War II, there has been a huge expansion in the number of copyrighted works
produced in the United States. Although once a net importer and exploiter of copyrighted works,
the United States is currently a net exporter ($1.5 billion in 1987) of copyrighted works. S. REP.,
supra note 2, at 3707 (figures on import and export compiled by the International Trade Commis-
sion). The United States reportedly lost between $43 billion and $61 billion due to piracy and inade-
quate protection of American works in 1986. Id. (figures compiled by the International Trade
Commission), As a result of these losses, the United States wants to ensure a minimum standard of
protection in a maximum number of countries. Id.
26. Id. at 3709. Although the United States left UNESCO for political reasons unrelated to the
UCC, it must suffer the consequences of its withdrawal by giving up all rights associated with the
organization. Because Berne is administered by WIPO, which deals only with intellectual property
issues, the United States' participation in WIPO can be more focused than is possible in UNESCO.
27. Id. The United States has added 24 nations to its list of copyright partners by joining
Berne. I1d. at 3708.
28. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat, A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
29. S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3706, 3710. Another advantage of adherence to Berne is that it will eliminate what is referred
to as the "back-door" to Berne. Id. at 3708. Berne extends copyright protection to the works of
authors from non-Berne countries if the works are published simultaneously in a Berne country. 1d.
(citing Berne, supra note 2, art. 3(1)). Many American authors published simultaneously in Canada,
a Berne country, to gain the protections of the treaty, but this process is expensive. Id. There is also
the risk that Berne countries that provide this "back-door" protection will retaliate against the
United States for not protecting works by their authors. Berne allows this type of retaliation when
reciprocity is not forthcoming from non-Berne countries. Berne, supra note 2, art. 6(1).
30. See AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 2, in ADHERENCE HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 430-32.
31. See Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988)
(codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 104, 116, 116A, 205, 301, 401-08, 411, 501, 504, 801 (West Supp.
1989)). Most significantly, the BCIA amends domestic copyright law with respect to notice of copy-
right, registration of copyright for Berne works that are not of American origin, and remedies for
infringement actions. Because Berne rejects formalities as prerequisites to copyright protection, see
Berne, supra note 2, art. 5(2), the United States was forced to amend both the notice and registration
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moral rights provision of Article 6bis was one protection not incorporated into
American law. Indeed, Congress expressly stated in the BCIA that, "[t]he pro-
visions of the Berne Convention... do not expand or reduce any right of an
author of a work ... to claim authorship of the work; or ... to object to any
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of... the work, that would preju-
dice the author's honor or reputation."'33
To garner the greatest support for the BCIA and for adherence to Berne,
Congress adopted a "minimalist" approach to compliance, 34 which meant that
Congress amended as little domestic law as possible to claim compliance with
Berne.35 No serious attempt was made to incorporate moral rights into domestic
law both for reasons of political expediency and because the concept of moral
rights is foreign to American property and copyright law. The goal of American
property and copyright law is to protect financial interests in a work.36 Moral
rights, on the other hand, protect the author's honor and reputation as embodied
by the work and are not easily quantified. Moral rights do not depend on pro-
prietary ownership of a work; rather, they represent the creativity behind the
work and hence have been termed "rights of personality." 37
provisions of the Copyright Code. Both notice and registration were required to receive protection
under American law, but under the BCIA those seeking United States copyright protection are no
longer required to affix the copyright symbol, copyright owner's name, and date of publication.
Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7(a)(2), 102 Stat. 2853, 2857 (1988)
(codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 401(a) (West Supp. 1989)). The BCIA also eliminates the requirement of
registering works of Berne-nation origin with the Copyright Office. Id. § 9(b)(1)(B) (codified at 17
U.S.C.A. § 411 (West Supp. 1989)). With the same stroke of the pen, however, Congress increased
the incentive for registering works by doubling statutory damages for registered works. Id. § 10(b)
(codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c) (West Supp. 1989)).
32. Two aspects of American copyright law that were changed before Berne adherence are the
duration of copyright protection and the manufacturing clause. The United States amended the
maximum term of copyright protection in 1976, extending it from 56 years (a 28 year term plus one
renewal term) to the life of the author plus 50 years. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90
Stat. 2572 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1982)). On July 1, 1986, the manufacturing clause (formerly
section 106 of the Copyright Code) expired. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (expired July 1, 1986). This
section required that English-language books and periodicals seeking American copyright protection
be printed from plates made or photoengraved in the United States or Canada. The manufacturing
clause was viewed as a prohibited formality to copyright protection. Nimmer, supra note 3, at 510.
33. Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 3(b), 102 Stat. 2853, 2853-
54 (1988).
34. See 134 CONG. REc. S14,552 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (encourag-
ing colleagues to make only those changes necessary to comply with Berne).
35. Because Berne allows each member nation to devise its own method for the protection of
authors' moral rights, the United States could claim that such rights are provided for in American
statutes other than copyright law. See Berne, supra note 2, art. 6bis(3) ("The means of redress for
safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country
where protection is claimed."). Most countries that recognize moral rights have not adopted the
entire spectrum of possible protections, and each country implements its moral rights laws differ-
ently. Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1025 & n.6 (1976).
France gives its creators more protection than any other country, with Italy, Germany, Spain, and
several Latin American countries falling somewhat behind. Id. Even Berne, the only international
treaty that guarantees moral rights, has limited its requirements in this area to the rights of paternity
and integrity. See Berne, supra note 2, art. 6bis.
36. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976)..
37. Merryman, supra note 35, at 1025. The rights of personality include the rights of identity,
name, reputation, occupation or profession, integrity, and privacy. Id. France and Italy see these
rights as a group of specific protections; Germany views them as a general category of rights. Id. at
1025-26 n.6.
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The two types of moral rights that Berne specifically protects-rights of
paternity and rights of integrity--can be divided into three subcategories for a
more detailed examination. The rights of paternity include the right of the au-
thor to attribution (or anonymity) as the creator of her work, the right to pre-
vent others from falsely claiming authorship of a work, and the right to prevent
others from attributing to an author a work she did not create.38 A French case
that enforced an author's right to be attributed as the creator of a work provides
an illustration of the first type of the rights of paternity. Guille v. Colmant 39
involved a contract between the French painter Guille and an art dealer who
required Guille to produce his paintings pseudonymously. The French court
held that an artist could not be deprived of the use of his real name by the terms
of a contract.4° Guille stands for the proposition that the right to be known as
the author of a work cannot be transferred away; the right is unique to the
creator.41 In the United States, by contrast, the author's right of attribution is
not guaranteed unless expressly stated in a contract.42
The second type of right of paternity-the right to prevent others from
falsely claiming authorship of a work-allows authors to enjoin acts of misrepre-
sentation and unfair competition.43 This right is recognized in the United States
but is based on the protection of an author's right to derive economic benefit
from her work.44 In Smith v. Montoro45 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the substitution of one actor's name for that of an-
other in a film's credits was improper because the named actor would be unjustly
enriched by claiming credit for the work of another.46 Under Berne, however,
the right of paternity should protect the true actor regardless of any financial
injury, because Berne protects an author's honor as well as his reputation. 47
The third type of right of paternity enables authors to prevent the use of
their names in association with works they did not create and do not endorse.
An illustrative case arose when a toymaker manufactured dolls based on charac-
ters created by Dr. Seuss and labeled them as such.48 Seuss sued in federal dis-
trict court to have his name disassociated from the dolls. The court recognized
no cause of action for injury to Seuss' honor or reputation so long as his name
was represented accurately. 49
The other type of moral rights protection specified by Berne-rights of in-
38. 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.21[A].
39. Cour d'appel Paris, 1967 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey [D.S. Jur.] 284.
40. Id.; see Merryman, supra note 35, at 1024.
41. Merryman, supra note 35, at 1024.
42. See Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947) (because the author did not
expressly contract for attribution of his photographs, the magazine could claim authorship).
43. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text (discussing remedies for false attribution).
44. See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981).
45. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
46. Id. at 607.
47. Berne, supra note 2, art. 6bis.
48. Geisel v. Poynter Prods., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The suit was brought by Dr.
Seuss' alter-ego, Theodor Seuss Geisel. Id.
49. Id. at 355.
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tegrity-prevents others from distorting, mutilating, or modifying a work in a
manner that would injure the author's honor and reputation. 50 One of the
starkest examples of a violation of the right of integrity involved the dismember-
ment and piece-by-piece sale of a work (a painted refrigerator) created by the
French artist Bernard Buffet. 5 1 A French court enjoined the separation and
individual sale of the panels.52 The artist DeChirico, however, lost a right-of-
integrity action in Italy. 3 DeChirico sought to enjoin a retrospective of his
works that he claimed would injure his reputation due to its emphasis on his
early works. DeChirico lost because this aspect of the right to integrity was not
covered in the Italian statute.5 4 These two cases represent the extremes of possi-
ble interpretations of the right to integrity.
This brief explanation of the moral rights protections that Berne is intended
to provide sets the stage for this Comment's discussion of the United States'
determination that domestic law adequately protects moral rights in this coun-
try. When the United States seriously began to consider joining Berne, legisla-
tors had divergent understandings of which aspects of domestic copyright law
required amendment for compliance with Berne.5 5 One of the primary difficul-
ties Congress had with the idea of recognizing the moral rights of authors was
that under Berne these rights are to be independent of the economic rights of the
copyright owner and the owner's property rights in the work itself.5 6 It was
difficult for legislators to conceive of a third interest in a work that the United
States would have to regulate without derogating the rights of either the owner
of the work or the owner of the copyright. In the political debate that ensued,
constituencies on both sides of the moral rights debate seemed to believe that by
granting authors moral rights, someone else would lose rights in the work.5 7
The decision against incorporating moral rights into domestic copyright
law reflects the United States' primary concern with the economic rights at-
tached to a work and not its "personality." 58 The United States' copyright stat-
ute grants the copyright owner the exclusive rights to reproduce the work,
prepare derivative works, distribute copies of the work, perform the work, and
display the work.5 9 Nowhere does the statute guarantee the author the right to
paternity-to have her name associated with a work-or the right to integrity-
50. Berne, supra note 2, art. 6bis(1). This right is recognized to varying degrees among Berne
countries. See Merryman, supra note 35, at 1029.
51. Cour d'appel Paris, Recucil Dalloz [D.Jur.] 570; see Merryman, supra note 35, at 1023.
52. Cour d'appel Paris, D. Jur. at 571; see Merryman, supra note 35, at 1023.
53. See Merryman, supra note 35, at 1032.
54. Id.
55. For an overview of the legislative proposals offered to amend domestic law to comply with
Berne, see Note, supra note 2, at 483-92.
56. See Berne, supra note 2, art. 6bis(l).
57. See AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 2, in ADHEREINCE HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 374 (state-
ment of Edward A. Merlis of the National Cable Television Association). The National Cable Tele-
vision Association claimed that moral rights beyond economic rights are "extremely suspicious" and
might inhibit editing that would be necessary to meet community standards for programming. Id.
According to the Cable Association, moral rights law would be "needless protection for private
interest at the public's expense." Id.
58. See generally Merryman, supra note 35, at 1025 (rights of personality defined).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
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to prevent distortion or mutilation of the work.60 Nonetheless, the Congress
concluded that these rights exist elsewhere in American law.61
Congress justified its decision not to provide explicitly for moral rights in
the BCIA by concluding that Berne is not a self-executing treaty and observing
that other Berne nations do not grant their authors the full protections offered
by article 6bis.62 At Roundtable Discussions held in Geneva with copyright
ministers from Switzerland, Hungary, Austria, Spain, Israel, Sweden, Finland,
Germany, and France, as well as WIPO, a House panel was informed that the
actual implementation of article 6bis in some other Berne nations does not differ
significantly from the protection afforded by American law.63
For example, Jean-Alexis Ziegler, Secretary General of the International
Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers in France, remarked that
moral rights are not separate from economic rights in theory, but in practice
they are alienable and may be contracted away or assigned to a third party, 64
specifically in the situation of an employment contract in which an employee
would relinquish the rights to a work as a condition of employment. 65 Perhaps
the most significant factor in the United States' decision not to enact any specific
moral rights legislation, however, was that no one at the Roundtable suggested
that the United States amend its law. 6 6 Thus, the United States exercised its
discretion by enacting the BCIA and joining Berne without any change in
60. See 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.21[C]-[E]. The right to paternity in the
United States is particularly difficult to identify, because there are situations in which an author
never has any rights to his work and they vest directly in his employer. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(1982) (employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author unless
otherwise agreed; such person or employer owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright).
61. AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 2, in ADHERENCE HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 458. The Ad
Hoc Group concluded that state law and federal case law could fill the gaps in current federal
legislative protection of moral rights. Id. at 460.
62. Congress included a sentence in the BCIA which makes it clear that Berne is not considered
to be a self-executing treaty in the United States: "The Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, signed at Berne, Switzerland, on September 9, 1886, and all acts, protocols, and
revisions thereto... are not self-executing under the Constitution and the laws of the United States."
Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2, 102 Stat. 2853, 2853 (1988).
63. BCIA Hearings, supra note 6, at 1154. (Roundtable Discussions at the end of all of the
hearings of the subcommittee). After Israel joined Berne, an Israeli poet sued in an Israeli court for
protection of his moral rights, claiming that some of his works prepared for a musical production
were distorted in the final show. Id. at 1138-39. The poet recovered for infringement of his eco-
nomic rights in the work but recovered nothing for the moral rights because, at the time, Israel did
not protect the right of integrity of the author. Id. It should be mentioned that the judge in this case
criticized the Israeli government for failing to enact legislation to comply with the moral rights
aspects of Berne. Id. But, because the treaty is not self-executing in Israel, the judge could apply
only domestic law and not the treaty itself. In 1981 Israel enacted moral rights legislation. Id.
64. Id. at 1154.
65. Id. This comment could be interpreted to encompass at least the second paragraph of the
work-for-hire provisions in American copyright law, which provides:
"work made for hire" is-
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work
... if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work
shall be considered a work made for hire ....
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
66. See BCIA Hearings, supra note 6, at 1159 (comments of Professor Verkade).
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American law in favor of authors' moral rights.67
When Congress rejected additional legislation regarding moral rights, it
mentioned several areas of domestic law that currently protect these rights.
These areas include the section of the Copyright Act on derivative works; 68
parts of the Lanham Act;69 common-law principles of defamation, misrepresen-
tation, unfair competition, and contracts;7 0 the right of privacy;7 1 and several
67. Before the Roundtable Discussions, Representative Kastenmeier introduced a bill that
would have added the rights of paternity and integrity to American copyright law. This bill was
withdrawn during the 100th Congress. See Note, supra note 2, at 489 (citing H.R. 1623, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., § 7 (1987)).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982). Section 106 of the Copyright Act guarantees copyright owners
certain exclusive rights in their copyrighted works, in particular the right "to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work." Id. A derivative work is based on the underlying work
but is presented in a form distinctive enough to possess its own creative qualities. Id. § 101. The
problem with using section 106 to protect moral rights is that it offers no shield against alterations
made directly to the underlying work.
69. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West. Supp. 1989). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prevents false
designations of origin and false descriptions of goods. It provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation or origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which-
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsor-
ship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person,
or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commer-
cial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or
is likely to be damaged by such act.
Id.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has been used most successfully to protect those whose names
have been associated falsely with a work. See, eg., Follett v. New Am. Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp.
304, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (discussed infra note 113). Section 43(a) also has been used to protect
authors whose work has been credited to another. See, e.g., Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 607
(9th Cir. 1981) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 101-03). Finally, this section of the Lan-
ham Act has been used to enjoin the presentation of a film that had been edited without the author's
consent. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussed infra
notes 125-35 and accompanying text).
70. See infra notes 82-110 and accompanying text. Each of these actions has its own set of
essential elements. These elements frequently have little to do with an author's right of personality.
For instance, defamation and misrepresentation require that the information presented to the public
be untruthful. See, e.g., Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1983) (falsity of statement is
an essential element of defamation); Rod Baxter Imports, Inc. v. Saab-Scania of Am., Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 245, 247 (D. Minn. 1980) (falsity of statement is an essential element of misrepresentation).
The right of paternity, however, allows the author to disassociate his name from a work, regardless
of whether it was presented truthfully. See Comment, supra note 6, at 871-73. A common-law
unfair competition claim requires an author to prove lost profits. Id. at 867-71. A contract claim is
valid only if the parties considered moral rights issues prior to contracting. Id. at 863-67.
71. Two theories emanating from the right of privacy will be examined for the purposes of this
Comment: "false light" and the right of publicity. The false light theory involves exposing certain
distinctive characteristics of an author's work in a distorted manner. See Big Seven Music Corp. v.
Lennon, 554 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (music company distributed uncut, "fuzzy" recording of
John Lennon's songs). The right of publicity stems from an author's right to derive profits from his
work and to prevent others (including the media) from presenting the work to the public without the
author's consent. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977)
("Much of [a performance's] economic value lies in the right of exclusive control over the publicity
given to [the] performance .... ); infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
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state statutes.72 This Comment will compare the protections provided by each
of these areas of the law to the guarantees of the rights of paternity and integrity.
Of the rights of paternity, the right of attrilution as the author of a work is
the least recognized in the United States.73 No federal statute protects the right
of an author to be known as the creator of her own work. American case law
gives an author no right of attribution unless provided for specifically in a con-
tract. In Suid v. Newsweek Magazine 74 the plaintiff alleged that Newsweek had
copied from his book without attribution to him. The Federal District Court for
the District of Columbia ruled for Newsweek, stating: "Plaintiff does not cite,
and this court has been unable to locate, any case recognizing a common-law
action for failure to attribute or misappropriation without attribution. '75 Thus,
an author can contract to have his name attributed to a work, but without a
written obligation to the contrary, the copyright owner enjoys exclusive control
over attribution of the work.76
Vargas v. Esquire, Inc. 77 was an action by a photographer to enjoin the use
of certain photographs that Esqupire used for a yearly calendar because Esquire
had ceased to publish the photographer's name with the photographs. 78 The
photographer's contract gave Esquire exclusive control over the photographs
and copyright. 79 The court held for Esquire stating: "Plaintiff by plain and un-
ambiguous language completely divested himself of every vestige of owner-
ship." 80 Without a contractual reservation of his rights, the court refused to
find for the photographer on any other theory of law.8 1
In the United States contracts are enforced according to their explicit
terms.82 Authors who enter into contracts are treated no differently from other
72. Eight states currently have statutes that protect the rights of artists to varying degrees.
Eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151-56; (West 1987);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 33 (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West 1986);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-1 to -8 (West 1987); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-10 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5.62-2
to -6 (1987). The effectiveness of these statutes depends on several factors, including citizenship of
the author, purchaser of the work, and location of the work at the time of the alleged moral rights
violation. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
73. See Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526-27 (7th Cir. 1947); Harris v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), rev'don other grounds, 139 F,2d 571
(2d Cir. 1943).
74. 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980).
75. Id. at 149.
76. Vargas, 164 F.2d at 525.
77. 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
78. Id. at 523.
79. Id. at 525.
80. Id.
81. The Vargas court concluded:
What plaintiff in reality seeks is a change in the law of this country to conform to that
of certain other countries. We need not stop to inquire whether such a change, if desirable,
is a matter for the legislative or judicial branch of the government; in any event, we are not
disposed to make any new law in this respect. It is... difficult to discern how there could
be any pirating or unlawful taking of property ... in view of the rights ... conferred on the
defendant.
Id. at 526-27.
82. Id. at 525; see also Goldberg, Commentary: The Illusion of "Moral Right" in American
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capable adults.8 3 If an author does not provide expressly for the right of attribu-
tion in his contract, a court will view this silence as a "grant by the author of all
that was not expressly retained rather than a retention by the author of all that
was not expressly granted."'84
If an author explicitly contracted away the right to attribution, however,
she will not be able to make a claim for false attribution.85 Contracting away
the right of attribution occurs most frequently in the context of works made for
hire. Assuming that moral rights are alienable,8 6 if an author enters into a
work-for-hire employment relationship, she immediately is divested of author-
ship rights in her work; those rights are transferred to her employer.8 7
One commentator has suggested that the work-for-hire arrangement defeats
the doctrine of moral rights:
[T]aking authorship of a work too readily from its creator-in-fact will
often run counter to the personal link between the individual creator
and the created work which underlies the [moral rights] notions of...
credit and integrity, to say nothing of the U.S.'s own historical objec-
tives and policies of promoting science and the useful arts through re-
ward to actual creators, as articulated in the Constitution.88
Other commentators point to the bargaining disadvantages of authors who are
unaware of their rights or are so eager to sell their work that they are willing to
contract away all of their rights.8 9 One writer has suggested that contracts that
deny authors the right of attribution should be considered void as against public
Law, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1043, 1045 (1977) (observing that courts have enforced authors' con-
tracts according to their terms).
83. Goldberg, supra note 82, at 1044.
84. Id. at 1046.
85. See Vargas, 164 F.2d at 526.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
87. "In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
88. ADHERENCE HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 172 (comments of John M. Kernochan, Nash
Professor of Law, Columbia University). The Berne Convention does not define "author" explicitly,
but Senator Cochran believes that work for hire does not comport with the United States' obligations
under Berne. 134 CONG. REc. S14,560 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Sen. Cochran). Senator
Cochran argued that
the right to claim authorship of one's own works under the Berne Convention is an aca-
demic one if the legal and practical effects of our own copyright laws undermine that
ight.... The question is not whether the Berne Convention explicitly requires changes in
our work for hire doctrine; it obviously does not. Instead, the question ought to be
whether the rights proclaimed by Berne are protected by U.S. copyright law.
Id,
Senator Cochran insisted on and received the assurances of Senators Leahy and DeConcini that
new work-for-hire legislation will be considered in the next session of Congress. Id. at S14,561-63.
Senator Cochran has introduced legislation that would amend the work-for-hire doctrine. See S.
1223, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S14,561-62 (1988).
89. See Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Rights Through Extension of
Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1560 (1972) [hereinafter Comment, Artistic
Integrity]; Comment, supra note 6, at 864 (citing J.B. Lippincott v. Lasner, 430 F. Supp. 993, 995-96
(S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
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policy or as adhesion contracts. 90 Other options for contractual interpretations
in favor of authors might balance unequal bargaining power with the reliance
interests of authors or rely on custom and usage in the trade.9 1 These theories
are the exceptions rather than the rule, however, and authors should not rely on
their application by the courts.
Authors have tried to find an implied contract right to paternity stemming
from common law unfair competition, but have met with little success. 92 A
recent case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit im-
plied a covenant of fair dealing in a contract, which might be extrapolated to an
authorship claim. 93 In Zilg v. Prentice Hall 94 plaintiff claimed that the pub-
lisher was obligated to use its best efforts to promote his book. The court held
that the contract implied only a good faith promise to promote the book, but
that this promise implied an effort to sell the book after initial promotion.9" The
situation in Zilg, however, should be distinguished from the situation in which
an author claims that there is an implied contractual term granting her a right to
attribution; there is no implied contract right to claim authorship of a work. 96
Consequently, authors always should provide specifically for rights of attribu-
tion, because courts are not likely to imply additional terms.
American law concerning unfair competition-both common-law claims 97
and suits under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act98-appears to protect the sec-
90. Comment, Artistic Integrity, supra note 89, at 1560. Adhesion contracts, generally held to
be void as against public policy, allow no bargaining power between the parties; instead, the party
who desires the goods or services must accept all of the conditions of the contract or decline the
goods or services. See Patterson, The Delivery ofa Life Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222
(1919).
91. Comment, supra note 6, at 864. Custom and usage in the trade can also work against an
author given the history of disregard for authors' rights after the sale of a work. See e.g., Preminger
v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 25 A.D. 830,
269 N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d 431, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1966). In Preminger,
Otto Preminger retained rights to final edits in his contract with Columbia, but the court viewed cuts
for commercials as a practice in the trade that Preminger should have anticipated. Id. at 371, 267
N.Y.S.2d at 603.
92. See Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1952). This case involved the granting of
an involuntary contract for the sale of phonograph records that defendant manufactured and sold at
a different r.p.m. without plaintiff's credit line. See also Nimmer, supra note 3, at 521 (noting that in
the absence of a contractual right, some courts will protect an author under a theory of unfair
competition).
93. Zilg v. Prentice Hall, 717 F.2d 671, 680 (2d Cir. 1983) ("We think the promise to publish
must be given some content and that it implies a good faith effort ... to give the book a reasonable
chance of achieving market success."), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 938 (1984). The Ad Hoc Working
Group saw this as a positive sign for authors. AD Hoc REPORT, supra note 2, in ADHERENCE
HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 463 & n.19. One commentator pointed out, however, that this interpre-
tation of a contract is far from uniform and does not obligate courts to grant recognition of author-
ship. Damich, Moral Rights in the United States and Article 6bis of the Berne Convention: A
Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 655, 657 (1986).
94. 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 938 (1984).
95. Id. at 679-80.
96. Good faith is an implied term in all contracts. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977). No such term
exists for attribution.
97. To recover for unfair competition under the common law, a plaintiff must prove lost reve-
nues, loss of business reputation, or other economic injury. Comment, supra note 6, at 870-71.
98. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West Supp. 1989). The Act prevents false designations of origins
and false descriptions of goods. All that is required for a Lanham Act suit is that the work affects
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ond type of paternity right: the right to prevent false attribution of a work.
Under these laws, an author is protected only if his name is omitted and an-
other's name is substituted.99 There appears to be no relief under these laws
solely for lack of attribution. l°
In Smith v. Montoro 10 1 the court refused to dismiss an actor's Lanham Act-
claim based on the improper removal of his name and the substitution of an-
other's name in film credits and advertisements. Plaintiff argued that his con-
tract assured him star billing and that substitution of another actor's name
deprived him of the benefits that follow from recognition as a performer. 10 2 The
court held that the plaintiff's claim should not have been dismissed, based on the
theory that he should benefit from his efforts.10 3
Although American unfair competition law affords some remedy in the
case of substituted attribution, it only protects authors from economic injury.'14
The theory of unfair competition is that a person should not reap economic
benefits from falsely "passing off" her work as that of another.10 5 Such damages
would be difficult to prove for an unknown author or for one involved in a col-
laborative venture. In addition, the emphasis on misappropriation of profits
seems antithetical to the concept of moral rights. An author protected by moral
right should be able to enjoin the misrepresentation of a work regardless of
whether she suffered any lost profits.
A third type of authorship right differs somewhat from omission or substi-
tution of attribution, but also derives from the idea of protecting the honor and
reputation of the author. In this third situation, the author wants to prevent the
use of his name on works that he did not create. 10 6 This right is protected by
interstate commerce and that there is a likelihood of public confusion about the authorship of the
work. F.E.L. Publications v. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 466 F. Supp. 1034, 1044
(N.D. Ill. 1978), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982), appeal dismissed, 739 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1984).
In F.E.L. Publications a publisher of religious music sued the National Conference of Catholic Bish-
ops for unauthorized duplications of "pirated" songbooks of which the bishops claimed authorship.
Id. at 1045. The publisher prevailed. Id. at 1046.
99. Berne protects against both the omission and the substitution of attribution by guaranteeing
the "rights to claim authorship of a work." Berne, supra note 2, art. 6bis. The United States, how-
ever, protects only against the substitution of attribution. The practice of withholding an author's
name and substituting the name of another is known as "reverse palming off." See PIC Design
Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (misappropriation and
renaming of plaintiff's copyrighted catalog). Commentators have suggested that this theory might
be extended to a pure omission of attribution situation under a theory of "implied reverse passing
off," but this theory has not been adopted by any court. Eg., 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra
note 2, § 8.21[E]; cf. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981) (referring to the theory
but not applying it to the facts of the case).
100. Damich, supra note 93, at 656-57. Damich also points out that the tort of misrepresenta-
tion does not protect an author from the omission of his name, at least without the simultaneous
substitution of another's name. Id. at 658.
101. 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
102. d. at 603.
103. Id. at 608.
104. Comment, supra note 6, at 868.
105. See Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 428, 132 N.E. 133, 137, cert. denied, 257 U.S. 654
(1921); see also Smith, 648 F.2d at 607 (substituting true author's name with that of another is
"wrongful because it involves an attempt to misappropriate or profit from another's talent or work-
manship" (emphasis added)).
f06. See Zim v. Western Publishing Co., 573 F.2d 1318, 1321 (5th Cir. 1978). "An author's
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the common-law claims of misrepresentation, defamation, and privacy, and by
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Even under these laws, however, unless the
author contracted otherwise, she may not object to the use of her name, if the
use represents her authorship truthfully or accurately represents that the work is
"based on" or "derived from" the author's work.10 7
A case illustrative of an author's objection to the use of his name and work
in a context that the author found undesirable for his reputation involved the use
of Dmitry Shostakovich's music in a film that the composer considered anticom-
munist.108 The court denied Shostakovich's claim, reasoning that the film com-
pany had not misrepresented the origin of his music.10 9 One commentator has
interpreted this holding to mean that "[t]he mere fact that the work is published
within a context which the artist finds objectionable does not constitute legal
grounds for objection." 110
The second situation in which the United States provides no protection for
the use of an author's name involves the creation of a derivative work by another
who gives credit or attributes his ideas to the original author. Not all credit is
flattering or positive in the eyes of the author, and frequently the author would
prefer not to be associated with the other work. In Geisel v. Poynter Products,
Inc. 111 Dr. Seuss sued Poynter Products for copying the design of some of his
characters to create dolls. The court.granted no relief for a claim that objected
to Poynter's disclosure that the inspiration for the dolls came from Dr. Seuss'
drawings.' 12 Therefore, as long as the attribution is true and does not mislead
the public, an author cannot object to the association of his name with the work
of another, regardless of the original author's disdain for the subsequent
work. 113
rights are violated if, without his consent, he is attributed to be the author of a work which he did
not in fact create." 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.21[D][2].
107. Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
108. Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd mem., 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949).
109. Id. at 70, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
110. Nimmer, supra note 3, at 522.
111. 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
112. Id. at 353.
113. In the United States, when authorship is not represented truthfully, the author has claims
for invasion of privacy and for violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. These causes of action
do not guarantee that the author's name will be deleted from the work, but that her involvement
with the work will be described accurately. See Zim v. Western Publishing Co., 573 F.2d 1318, 1324
(5th Cir. 1978) (privacy claim); Follett v. New Am. Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304, 311 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (Lanham Act claim). In Zim a publisher breached its agreement with the author of several
science and nature books by publishing a revision of the author's works under the author's name,
despite his disapproval. Zim, 573 F.2d at 1325-26. The court ruled for the author, analogizing the
unauthorized use of the author's name to" 'public disclosure of private facts.'" Id. at 1327 (citation
omitted). In Follett writer Ken Follett won a Lanham Act suit against a publisher for the wrongful
use of his name in association with a book that he translated. The court held that the publisher must
represent that Follett translated rather than wrote the book, explaining that this was an "accommo-
dation ... essential to assure that the public will not be misled." Follett, 497 F. Supp. at 313.
In one case, not involving an author's name, protection was granted for the title of a film based
on the concepts of honor and reputation. Brandon v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 441 F. Supp. 1086
(D. Mass. 1977). The Brandon court held that
a film title ... is entitled to judicial protection under the common law doctrine of unfair
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Authors objecting to the use of their names in association with a work also
may have a cause of action under the false light theory of privacy, which is based
on the misappropriation of the unique personal characteristics of the author and
the unflattering exposure of these characteristics to the public. 114 False light
damages are based more on injury to personal reputation than on pecuniary
harm. 115 Although this theory has provided a remedy for false attribution
claims,1 16 it is helpful only to well-known authors.1 17
The right of integrity-the right to object to the distortion or mutilation of
a work-has proven even more difficult for United States authors to achieve
than the right of paternity. The right of integrity implies that after the author
sells a work and transfers copyright, the owner may keep and enjoy the work,
but may not take it apart piece by piece.118 The right of integrity is foreign to
the American concept of property ownership; in the United States, when one
owns an object, she may use it as she wishes.
In Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church 119 an artist unconditionally sold a
fresco to a church, but when the congregation objected to the bare-chested de-
piction of Jesus Christ, the church painted over the work. 120 The artist objected
and sued for restoration of the work. The court ruled that the painting no
longer belonged to the artist and that he had no cause of action in the absence of
any writing reserving his rights in the fresco.1 2 1 The court also reiterated the
holding of an earlier artist contract decision that "[t]he conception of 'moral
rights' of authors so fully recognized and developed in the civil law countries has
not yet received acceptance in the law of the United States. No such right is
referred to by legislation, court decision or writers."
1 22
The same result was reached in Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,123 in
which Otto Preminger sued to enjoin cuts made in his films for television view-
competition.., when it has attained a "secondary meaning," Le., when it associated in the
minds of a substantial number of people with the goodwill that that particular film has
achieved through public distribution and advertising.
Id. at 1091.
114. Comment, supra note 6, at 873. The origin of the "false light" theory comes from an article
by Prosser. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. Rav. 383, 398-401 (1960). False light was not the
specific cause of action for a suit by Bette Midler against Ford Motor Company to prevent it from
using a sound-alike singer in a television advertisement, but the court enjoined Ford from misappro-
priating Ms. Midler's singing style based on a false light rationale. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849
F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) ("We hold only that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is
widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated
what is not theirs and have committed a tort.").
115. Prosser, supra note 114, at 400.
116. See Big Seven Music Corp. v. Lennon, 554 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (record company
produced and sold "shoddy" album of John Lennon's songs).
117. Comment, Artistic Integrity, supra note 89, at 1549 n.59.
118. Merryman, supra note 35, at 1027.
119. 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949).
120. Id. at 571-72, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
121. Id. at 576-77, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
122. Id. at 575, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 818 (quoting Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir.
1947)).
123. 49 Misc. 2d 363, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 25 A.D. 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913,
aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E.2d 431, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1966).
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ing. In Preminger's contract with Columbia, he specifically retained the right to
approve all final cuts and edits of the film. When Preminger sued to enjoin fur-
ther cuts and edits to insert commercials, however, the court held that Prem-
inger should have anticipated this type of editing when he licensed the film for
television. 124 Evidently Preminger never had the right to object to cuts for the
insertion of commercials.
In 1976 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in
favor of the author in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 125 a case very
similar to Preminger. The British comedy troupe, Monty Python's Flying Cir-
cus, through an agreement with the British Broadcasting Company, contracted
with the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) to have several of its pro-
grams broadcast on American television. There was no explicit agreement be-
tween Monty Python and ABC on editorial control or commercial spots, but the
troupe "assumed that ABC would broadcast each of the Monty Python pro-
grams 'in its entirety.' "126 ABC showed the first of these programs, devoting
twenty-four minutes of the ninety-minute broadcast to commercials.127 Monty
Python was "appalled" at the discontinuity and mutilation of the program and
sued to enjoin the broadcast of the second program.' 28 The district court
granted Monty Python's motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that" 'the
plaintiffs have established an impairment of the integrity of their work' which
'caused the film or program... to lose its iconoclastic verve.' "129
The second circuit affirmed, holding that ABC's publishing of the programs
in a truncated version, if proven, exceeded the purpose of its license130 and con-
stituted an unauthorized use of the underlying work.13 The court declared that
there is no "implied consent to edit"'132 and eliminated the burden on the author
to retain alteration rights specifically. The court also refused to accept the dis-
sent's argument that running a disclaimer during the titles would disassociate
the troupe adequately from the edited version. 133 Gilliam opened the door to
other claims against the distortion or mutilation of works, but it still refused to
recognize that American law is in any way designed to protect the author's
moral rights. 134
Unfortunately, Gilliam will not help authors in all situations of mutilation
or destruction. It still does not help the author who explicitly contracts away
copyright of a work. One commentator believes that it will not provide a cause
124. Id. at 371, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
125. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).




130. Id. at 20.
131. Id. at 21.
132. Id. at 23.
133. "We are doubtful that a few words could erase the indelible impression that is made by a
television broadcast, especially since the viewer has no means of comparing the truncated version
with the complete work in order to determine for himself the talents of plaintiffs." Id. at 25 n.13.
134. See id. at 24.
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of action in the case of the total destruction of a work, because there is no false
description or designation involved when no one has access to the work. 135
In Serra v. General Services Administration 136 the artist encountered an al-
leged violation of his right to integrity that touched on several areas of American
law, but found relief in none of them. Richard Serra created a sculpture titled
"Tilted Arc," which the General .Services Administration (GSA) purchased for
its Art in Public Places program. The sculpture drew the objections of several
federal workers, who claimed that it obstructed their regular use of Federal
Plaza. In 1985, after three days of public hearings, GSA decided to relocate the
work to a more appropriate spot. Serra claimed that Federal Plaza was the only
appropriate spot for the sculpture because his work is "site specific.' 1 37. Serra
retained the copyright in his work, so the case was not a battle between the
economic and the moral rights interests in the work. 138 Rather, the case pitted
the display right of the work's owners against the artist's right to prevent the
display of his work in a manner that he believed would distort its meaning. The
Serra court not only ruled for the owner, but also failed even to recognize a
cause of action in the artist.' 39 Given the reaction of the court to Serra's claim,
it is evident that the Gilliam holding has not yet had a pervasive impact on
American courts in extending the right of integrity in a work beyond the eco-
nomic benefit that the author might derive from the work.
Another frequently cited source of American protection of the right of in-
tegrity is found in section 106(2) of the Copyright Act,14° which concerns the
copyright owner's exclusive right to create derivative works from the original.141
It is true that section 106(2) prevents others from altering an author's work in a
certain sense, but it may cover only adaptations of the original and not distor-
tions or mutilations of the work itself. 142 In addition the author is not necessar-
ily protected by section 106(2), which protects the "copyright owner," because
the author may have transferred the copyright. Any transfer of the copyright is
a transfer of the right to create derivative works, and there is no separate right of
integrity retained by the author under section 106(2).143
135. Merryman, supra note 35, at 1035.
136. 667 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988).
137. Id. at 1045. "Site specific" is an artistic term that means that the work is specially designed
for a location so as to be integrated into the surroundings. Moving the work, under Serra's theory,
would be tantamount to destroying it. Id. at 1046.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1047-52.
140. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
141. The definition of a derivative work is "a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensa-
tion, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted... [including]...
editorial revisions, annotations, or other modifications." Id.
142. 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.21[C][3]. Nimmer implies that the defini-
tion of "derivative work" in the Copyright Act may not and should not embrace all changes, but
only those changes that result in bona fide adaptations. Changes that are distortions or mutilations
of a work, therefore, would not be included. See Damich, supra note 93, at 659-60.
143. 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.21 [C][3]; see Geller, Comments on Possible
U.S. Compliance with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, 10 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 665, 673
(1986).
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One right frequently cited by those who believe that the United States guar-
antees adequate moral rights protections for authors is the right to publicity
based on the constitutional right to privacy. 144 In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcast Co. 145 defendant news station gave plaintiff credit for his work and
did not misrepresent the content of the work or its authorship. Defendant did
not distort, mutilate, or modify plaintiff's work or injure his honor or reputa-
tion; in fact, plaintiff's honor and reputation might have been enhanced by the
publicity. Plaintiff Zacchini was a "human cannonball," and defendant filmed
his act without his consent and broadcast it on the local news.146 Despite the
broadcaster's privilege "to include in its newscast matters of public interest," 147
Mr. Zacchini prevailed.' 48 The court held that, unlike other publicity cases,
"this case ... involved not the appropriation of an entertainer's reputation to
enhance that attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of
the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first
place." 49  The Court's message was that, because defendant broadcast
Zacchini's performance, the public would not have to pay to see the show, and
Zacchini would not be able to earn a living.' 50 The right of the individual pre-
vailed over the right of the public based on the belief that ultimately the public
would benefit more by encouraging individuals to pursue their unique talents.15 1
But as with several of the legal protections mentioned above, it seems as though
the theory behind the right of publicity is to protect the author's economic inter-
est in a work, not the integrity of the work.' 52
The final area of law that Congress claims will satisfy the United States'
obligation to protect moral rights under Berne is statutory protections granted
to artists by individual states.153 Currently eight states 54 have some form of art
or artist protection statute to guarantee certain rights to paternity, integrity, or
resale royalties.155 These statutes were enacted to protect and preserve certain
144. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 US. 562, 567 (1977).
145. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
146. Id. at 564.
147. Id. at 569.
148. Id. at 566.
149. Id. at 576.
150. Id. at 575-76.
151. Id. at 576 ("The [publicity] protection provides an economic incentive for [plaintiff] to
make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public."). The dissent
criticized this recognition of individual rights over public rights and claimed the first amendment
rights of the defendant were overly compromised in the majority's decision. Id. at 581 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
152. The Court implied that it was willing to protect Zacchini's human cannonball performance
only insofar as he could earn a living from it. The Court recognized no nonfinancial interest in the
performance. See id. at 575-76.
153. 134 CONG. REC. S14,553 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
154. E.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 986 (West Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151-56 (West
1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 33 (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West
1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-1 to -8 (West 1987); N.Y. ARTS & CUL. AFF. LAW § 14.03
(McKinney Supp. 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-10 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 5-62-2 to -6 (1987).
155. Resale royalty rights, or droit de suite, are granted only under the California statute. See
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 986 (West Supp. 1989), They entitle the artist to a certain commission on all
resales of a work. Berne includes a section on droit de suite, which acknowledges that such a right
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rights of the artist after the sale of a work. 15 6 The degree of statutory protection
varies from state to state, but the common goals are to protect the reputation of
the artist by restricting the ability of others to alter or deface his work 157 and to
assure that the author receives credit for his work. 158
There are problems with the proposition that these eight state statutes con-
tribute to American adherence to Berne. Since these statutes apply only to
works bought, sold, or owned in states or produced by resident citizens, signifi-
cant jurisdictional difficulties can arise. State law may be preempted by federal
law,159 in personam jurisdiction may be difficult to establish, 160 and foreigners
might find the inconsistency of protection among the states confusing and frus-
trating. These practical situations illustrate the limited and inconsistent protec-
tion for moral rights that state statutes provide. Ironically, one commentator has
noted that these statutes are the only real moral rights protection in the United
States, for if there were a unified system of moral rights, there would have been
exists in certain countries, but makes the right optional for other Berne nations. Berne, supra note 2,
art. 14ter. National artists' rights legislation, which has been introduced but not acted upon, in-
cludes a resale royalty provision. See S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. Sll,470
(1987) (introduced by Sen. Kennedy); H.R. 3221, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. Rc. H7,352
(1987) (introduced by Rep. Markey).
156. Note, Using Long Arm Principles to Expand Artists' Rights: Will it Work?, 6 CARDOZO
ART & ENT. L.J. 139, 139 (1987).
157. Before the passage of the Pennsylvania law, artist Alexander Calder had no cause of action
against the Pittsburgh airport for repainting his mobile which was displayed in the terminal. Id. at
143-44. The mobile was originally black and white, but was repainted yellow and green to comple-
ment the decor of the terminal. Id. at 144 n.35. Pennsylvania law now provides that "[n]o person,
except an artist who owns and possesses a work of fine art which the artist has created, shall inten-
tionally commit, or authorize the intentional commission of, any physical defacement, mutilation,
alteration or destruction of a work of fine art." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2104(a) (Purdon Supp.
1988). Section 2104 extends the same protection against acts of "gross negligence." Id. § 2104(b).
158. For a more detailed examination of the provisions of these statutes, see Note, supra note
156.
159. Professor Nimmer expressed concern that these state laws might be preempted by federal
copyright law. 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.21[C][2]. The primary reason these
state laws are not preempted, however, is that the rights they protect are not "equivalent" to any
rights protected by federal law. Id. (noting that the federal right to produce derivative works may
overlap with some of the state protections, but that the overlap would be minimal). Section
301(b)(3) of the Copyright Code specifies that "[n]othing in this title annuls or limits any rights or
remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to... activities violating legal
or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright. .. ." 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1982).
Congress made a special effort to stress in the BCIA that federal preemption under section 301
will not change with American adherence to Berne. Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-568, § 6, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857 (1988). A preemption problem could arise only if Congress
amends the Copyright Code to include moral rights.
160. State statutes protecting moral rights are valid within the jurisdiction of the states, but what
if a work purchased in a moral rights state is taken out of the state and destroyed elsewhere? Does
the state in which the purchase occurred have jurisdiction over the purchaser? See Note, supra note
156, at 141. Each state would have to apply its own long arm statute to such situations and rely on
facts to establish the defendant's "minimum contacts" with the forum in the context of "fair play
and substantial justice." Id. at 146 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)). Alternatively, the state might use the "balancing test," considering the plaintiff's and de-
fendant's interest in the jurisdiction. Id. at 148 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462 (1985)). This option might be extremely difficult for a foreigner who is not considered a citizen
of the forum state, and a foreigner who sold a work abroad might not have a valid claim. Regardless
of the state, however, if the purchaser is from out of state and is unaware that by purchasing a work
of art he is consenting to the jurisdiction of that state, it may be a violation of due process to exert
jurisdiction over him. Id. at 153.
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no reason for the states to enact special statutes. 161
The noncompliance of other member nations with Berne's moral rights pro-
visions was the United States' major justification for relying on existing domestic
laws and failing to enact new legislation specifically to protect moral rights. 162
This rationale ignores any obligation that the United States might have, or wish
to have, as a world leader in intellectual property protection if it wants to en-
courage other nations to join Berne or extend Berne protections to the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade. 163 This rationale also ignores the potential
benefits the United States and its citizens might derive from moral rights
protection.
These benefits potentially supplied by strict adherence to Berne moral
rights provisions can be divided into five categories: international relations, eco-
nomic equity, social recognition of authors, cultural and intellectual enhance-
ment, and individual rights.
In the area of international relations, moral rights is an integral part of
Berne, and several Berne members who take moral rights seriously eventually
might see the United States as avoiding its responsibilities under the treaty. The
United States can claim that it grants more moral rights protection than other
Berne nations, 164 but the United States must realize that those other nations are
not viewed as world leaders. The United States sets the standard for business
practices for the Western world; it would be unrealistic to expect other nations
to accept fully the United States commitment to Berne without domestic legisla-
tion that ensures compliance with all aspects of the treaty.
Moral rights protection also may provide economic benefits to the United
States. One of the reasons that the United States has rejected a more compre-
hensive system of moral rights protections is the claim that moral rights will
upset existing business practices and economic relationships. 165 Businesses have
relied on the bedrock principles of contract and property law for years and see
moral rights as a threat to the established order. 166 These apprehensions, while
understandable if taken to the extreme, appear unfounded in light of other coun-
tries' experiences with moral rights. 167
161. Damich, supra note 93, at 660.
162. See supra note 35. France, the mother of moral rights, is on one end of the spectrum of
protections for authors and artists. Other Berne nations, such as Australia, Ireland, Liechtenstein,
and South Africa, "do not grant the right to claim authorship," however. AD Hoc REPORT, supra
note 2, in ADHERENCE HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 461. The degree to which Berne members
protect the right to integrity also varies, from total absence of statutory protection to detailed provi-
sions. Id. at 465.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
164. See supra notes 68-72, 162-63 and accompanying text.
165. BCIA Hearings, supra note 6, at 82.
166. Id. at 82-86. The publishing industry in particular fears that American courts will draw on
European court decisions to allow writers to object to any editing of their work. The cable television
industry also has reservations about additional moral rights protections. See Adherence learings,
supra note 2, at 374 (statement of Edward A. Merlis of the National Cable Television Association),
167. France has the most developed moral rights law in the world, Merryman, supra note 35, at
1042, and still maintains an active film and publishing industry. European moral rights laws, and
presumably any American counterpart, do not go so far as to alter the political economies of their
nations so that industry is infirm. The German representative at the Roundtable Discussions at-
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One of the economic advantages of moral rights legislation is that it will
protect unknown and less affluent artists, who are not aware that they can con-
tract to protect their rights or who are reluctant to negotiate for protection for
fear of losing a sale. Moral rights legislation can prevent the exploitation of
authors' talents for others' economic gain.
Moral rights legislation can also expand the social importance of the Amer-
ican author. A list of great Americans compiled by the average citizen probably
would not mention many authors or artists. European moral rights evolved in
part due to the social influence of artists and writers.1 68 Perhaps moral rights
will have a reverse effect in the United States, and by giving authors additional
rights they will receive additional respect from society. t 69
Moral rights also can heighten cultural and intellectual awareness in the
United States. The right to paternity and integrity can be viewed as methods of
maintaining an unadulterated historical record of Ameican ingenuity. When
we do not know who the author is or what a work looked like in its original
form, part of our perception of history is distorted. 170 A firm reference point for
further thought and understanding about our culture can be lost forever. Pro-
tection and preservation of creative works adds depth to the American
experience.
The final reason why the United States should protect moral rights is that
these rights represent the type of individuality and freedom on which this coun-
try is based. Moral rights encompass freedom of speech and freedom of the
press. 171 When a creator sells a work, the buyer purchases the tangible form but
not the essence of the work. If the purchaser misrepresents or alters the work,
however, it is as if the author never had the freedom to create it originally.
Legislation that would extend moral rights protection to artists has been
introduced in both houses of Congress. 172 This Comment suggests more com-
prehensive legislation, which combined with amendments to the work-for-hire
tempted to allay American fears about an expanding number of frivolous lawsuits in the moral rights
area by noting that only one suit had been brought by a journalist under German law, and that suit
involved an entire rewrite of an author's article without changing the by-line. BCIA Hearings, supra
note 6, at 1153.
168. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
169. Moral rights will at least guarantee that authors will receive more respect from the business
community which wants to market their works.
170. There is a generation of American youth who think the Beatles' hit song "Revolution" was
written for a Nike advertisement. See Magiera, Discord on "Revolution"' McCartney Hits Nike,
Jackson for Use of Song, 58 ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 26, 1987, at 36.
171. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
172. H.R. 3221, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H7,352 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987); S.
1619, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S1 1,470 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1987) (reintroduced as S.
1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S6,810 (daily ed. June 6, 1989)). This parallel legisla-
tion protects only the rights of visual artists in pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work. It guarantees
as a right of paternity the right to claim or disclaim authorship of "any... works which are publicly
displayed." S. 1619, supra, § 3(b)(1); H.R. 3221, supra, § 3(b)(1). The bills also prohibit "the signifi-
cant or substantial distortion, mutilation, or other alteration... [of an author's work]... caused by
intentional act or gross negligence ...... S. 1619, supra, § 3(b)(1); H.R. 3221, supra, § 3(b)(1). In
addition to the rights of paternity and integrity the bills provided for resale royalty rights. S. 1619,
supra, § 3(b)(l); H.R. 3221, supra, § 3(b)(1); see supra, note 155.
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doctrine, 173 would make the United States' adherence to Berne less self-serving
and more in line with the true spirit of the Convention.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO 17 U.S.C. § 106, FOR THE PROTECTION OF
AUTHORSHIP AND INTEGRITY IN LITERARY, ARTISTIC, DRAMATIC AND MUSI-
CAL WORKS1 74
(A) Purpose
To provide American authors and the authors of nations that are
members of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic works the right to claim authorship of their works and the
right to object to the distortion, mutilation, or alteration of their works
that would prejudice their honor or reputation even after transfer of
the work. These rights shall exist independent of copyright protection
and will continue for the life of the author plus fifty years. 175
(B) Definitions
(1) Author-creator or creators of artistic, literary, dramatic and
musical works.
(2) Authorship-the right to claim attribution; the right to pre-
vent false attribution; the right to prevent the use of an au-
thor's name in a manner that will be injurious to the author's
honor or reputation.
(3) Distortion-alteration of a work that severely misrepresents
its physical and artistic attributes.
(4) Mutilation-the dismemberment or destruction of a work.
(5) Other Alteration-significant changes to a work to which the
author has not consented.
(6) Transfer-sale, lease, or gift of the work or its copyright.
(C) Alienability of Rights
The author of a literary, artistic, dramatic, or musical work shall be
immediately, upon completion of the work, vested with the right to
claim authorship and to object to distortion, mutilation, or other alter-
ation of the work. These rights may be contracted away pursuant to
negotiations between the author and the transferee. If these rights are
not mentioned in a contract signed by the author, they are presumed to
rest with the author. This includes works made for hire.
(D) Preemption
This statute preempts state laws that provide lesser protection for au-
thor's rights but does not prevent states from enacting more stringent
protection for authors.
(E) Federal Artistic and Literary Advisory Panel
There shall be created a federal panel, comprised of representatives from
the Copyright Office, private industry, academia, the creative arts, and the
173. See supra notes 87-88.
174. This definition is intended to encompass all of the categories of protected works in section
102 of the Copyright Act: literary works, musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes and choreo-
graphic works, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, motion pictures, and sound recordings. See
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
175. This term is identical to that of the current copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982).
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legal profession, to advise the Copyright Office in promulgating regulations
pursuant to this section with particular attention to acceptable contract
provisions for the rights protected under this law. 17 6
(F) Remedies
Remedies may be injunctive, monetary, or both. The author need not suffer
financial harm to sue for an injunction.
The goal of the proposed amendment is to establish a moral rights scheme
in the United States that mirrors the protections of Berne. Section A is not as
general in nature as article 6bis of Berne, however, because each significant new
term is defined in section B to provide some guidelines for implementation of the
statute.
The use of qualifying terms such as "severely" and "significantly" to de-
scribe prohibited forms of alteration of a work should convey the understanding
that this statute will not support frivolous claims. These terms should also allay
the fears of publishers, art conservators, and others who are committed to
presenting a work to the public in its best possible light.
The definition that likely will incur the most opposition is the inclusion of
works made for hire among the works that may not be misrepresented or dis-
torted without the author's consent (section C). The application of the work-
for-hire doctrine has been the topic of a long history of debate. 177 The Supreme
Court recently issued a definitive interpretation of the work-for-hire section of
the Copyright Code.1 7 8 Under United States copyright law, employees ulti-
mately have no rights to works they create in the scope of employment. Those
who employ creative employees would prefer that the law remain unchanged,
because their economic interest in their employees' creative work could be
threatened by direct negotiations over the right of attribution or alteration of a
work.
The proposed legislation requires negotiation between employers and em-
ployees, as well as authors and purchasers of their work, over moral rights, but
is not intended or expected to provoke profound changes in their relationships.
The purpose of the amendment is to inform creators of their rights and provide
an opportunity for them to negotiate for the protections they desire. This
amendment does not intend to make all employees independent contractors, but
it should entitle them to claim credit for the work they have done.
Requiring contract negotiations on specific moral rights issues also should
benefit the independent author, who may be so intent on making a sale that he
176. The panel will serve as an advisory group on important moral rights issues upon the request
of Congress or the Copyright Office.
177. For a thorough discussion of the debate over work for hire, see Note, Copyright, Independ-
ent Contractors, and the Work-For-Hire Doctrine: Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
67 N.C.L. REv. 994, 999-1005 (1989).
178. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2174-78 (1989). The
Court held that the status of an author as an employee or independent contractor should be deter-
mined under the principles of agency law. Id. at 2178. Once status is determined, a court can apply
the provisions of section 101 of the copyright statute, which denies employees any rights to their
works and requires a signed contract for independent contractors to relinquish their rights. 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "work-made-for-hire").
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forgets that his reputation depends on the continued physical integrity of the
work and his right to attribution. This amendment merely shifts the burden to
the buyer to obtain consent from the author before altering or misrepresenting
the work. The buyer can obtain all rights to a work under this amendment, if
the author consents.
The amendment allows states to enact more stringent moral rights legisla-
tion than the federal government. California's statute already exceeds the protec-
tions of this statute in some respects. 179 By creating a minimum standard of
moral rights protection, while leaving room for states to expand on this protec-
tion, the United States can comply with Berne and experiment with other moral
rights concepts.
Section E, the advisory panel, provides a safety valve for the legislation.
Many in the publishing, entertainment, and business world fear that any type of
moral rights legislation will upset business relationships and bring on frivolous
lawsuits. This section is intended to assure prudent and effective implementa-
tion of the law by seeking input from various members of the copyright commu-
nity in the regulatory process.
Section F of the proposed legislation reinforces the concept that moral
rights are not always quantifiable in dollar terms. By allowing authors to sue for
injunctions without money damages, the United States will recognize the value
of the right of personality without attaching a dollar figure to its worth.
Despite all the virtues of federal moral rights protection, it seems unlikely
that Congress will add moral rights to domestic law. In addition to organized
opposition to moral rights specifically, there is, in 1989, a cloud of suspicion
surrounding the arts in general. Since New Yorkers finally tore down "Tilted
Arc,"1 80 one suspects that they will not embrace federal legislation that would
preserve similar works. The public does not support all art and might object to a
law that protects all artists. 181
Congress also has been suspicious of the arts recently. The National En-
dowment for the Arts (NEA) funded two controversial exhibits in 1988-89 that
Congress and members of the public found objectionable. 18 2 The House of Rep-
resentatives' reaction to the funding of these projects was to withdraw the cost of
the exhibits from NEA's budget for 1990.183 Although the budget cut expressed
Congress' disapproval of only two exhibits funded by the NEA, a recent amend-
179. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West Supp. 1989). The California statute gives artists resale
royalty rights, the right to receive a percentage of the profits of subsequent sales of their works. Id.
While this economic right is not part of the proposed legislation, it is not the purpose of this legisla-
tion to preempt the California law or dissuade other states from enacting similar legislation.
180. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
181. For some interesting comments on public reactions to public art, see Is the Public (and Are
the Artists) Ready for Public Art?, Raleigh News & Observer, Aug. 28, 1988, at 3E, col. 1.
182. One of the projects, by the late Robert Mapplethorpe, depicts men in homoerotic positions
and nude children in suggestive poses. The other project, by Andres Serrano, is a photograph of a
crucifix immersed in urine. See Senate Votes to Ban Funds for "Obscene" Artworks, L.A. Times, July
27, 1989, § 6, at 1, col. 1.
183. Amendment to Department of the Interior Appropriations Bill, 135 CONG. REc. H3,652-
53 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (offered by Rep. Stenholm).
[Vol. 68
BERNE CONVENTION
ment passed by the Senate would prohibit federal funding of any work that is
considered "obscene or indecent." 184 Based on this Congressional activity it can
be inferred that, if Congress believes that it justifiably can control the works that
it purchases, there would be little support for legislation that restricts any pur-
chaser of a creative work from presenting it in a manner she considers appropri-
ate, regardless of the rights of the author.
The legislation proposed above attempts to set a moderate course for pro-
tecting authors' rights and encourages dialogue among the various constituen-
cies interested in creative works. Congress should recognize the value of offering
greater protections to authors and consider moral rights legislation a positive
addition to American law.
DEBORAH Ross
184. Amendment to Department of the Interior Appropriations Bill, 135 CONG. REc. S8,806
(daily ed. July 26, 1989) (offered by Sen. Helms). Senator Helms' amendment died in conference
committee. Honan, Conferees Reject a Plan to Curb Federal Funds for Obscene Act, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 30, 1989, at 1, col. 1. The conference committee agreed on an alternative proposal that would
restrict federal funding of "obscene" art, using the definition of obscenity adopted by the Supreme
Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Id. The committee also set up procedures for the
creation of a committee to review grantmaking policies. Id. The conference report was approved by
the House and Senate and signed into law on October 24, 1989. Department of Interior Appropria-
tions Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701 (1989).
The Serrano exhibit was sponsored by the Southeastern Center for Contemporary Art
(SECCA). The North Carolina legislature responded to SECCA's exhibit of the work by denying
state funds for the Awards in the Visual Arts Program. Act of Aug. 10, 1989, ch. 752, 1989 N.C.
Sess. Laws 18. Ironically, the North Carolina legislature has no history of funding this program.
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